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Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections:
The Constitutionality of Florida's Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act
by Erika Concetta Pagano and Emily Horowitz

Introduction
On a sunny South Florida morning,Josh, an eighteen-year-old
honor student, borrowed his older brother's car to go to an earlymorning orthodontist appointment.
Somewhere before reaching his doctor's office, Josh spotted
the alternating assault of blue and red lights in the rear view mirror.
He pulled over and respectfully engaged in a conversation with the
officer, who cited Josh for a broken taillight. Before concluding the
vehicle stop, the officer recognized the car, and announced that
he needed to take a peek inside. Without hesitation,Josh agreed.
Though ts of perfectly aligned teeth were quickly interrupted by
the unexpected clank of handcuffs. The officer found a backpack
containing a bottle of valium with the prescription label crudely
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scraped off in the car's passenger seat, 1 and now Josh was under
arrest for violating Florida Statute§ 893.13, the state's Drug Abuse
-Prevention & Control Act ("DAPCA"). 2 Under the act, Josh would
potentially face the possibility of criminal conviction for a nonstrict liability crime without consideration of mens rea.
The Florida Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court have
been locked in a ten-year battle over whether the state can convict
individuals for drug possession under DAPCA without establishing
knowledge as an element of the crime. In a landmark decision,
Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, United States District
Judge Mary Scriven 3 declared DAPCA an unconstitutional affront
to Floridians' basic freedoms. This comment argues that Judge
Scriven's decision in Shelton is correct.

Facts-A Guilty Act Without A Guilty Mind?
In 2004, Mackle Vincent Shelton was arrested and charged
in an eight-count indictment, including one count of delivery
of cocaine. 4 A state court jury found Shelton guilty of five
counts, including delivery of cocaine. 5 Shelton was sentenced to
eighteen years in prison. 6 Pursuant to Florida's post-2002 Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act amendment of§ 893.101, the
jury was not instructed that knowledge was an element of the
offense. 7 Rather, the state only had to prove two elements beyond
a reasonable doubt: "[I] That Mackle Vincent Shelton delivered
a certain substance; and [2] That the substance was cocaine." 8
Shelton's appeals were denied by both the trial court and Florida's
Fifth District Court of Appeal. However, Shelton eventually filed a

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8

State v. Washington, No. Fll-11019, 6 n.9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011).
FLA. STAT.§ 893.13 (1997).
Judge Mary Scriven was nominated to the Middle District of Florida by George
W. Bush. She was confirmed by the Senate on September 26, 2008, and
received commission on September 30, 2008. Prior to her nomination, Judge
Scriven served as a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Middle District.Judge Scriven
received her B.A. from Duke University in 1983, and her JD. from Florida
State University College of Law in 1987.
Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1295-6.
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petition for federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida. 9 Ruling on the petition,
.Judge Scriven held that because Section 893.13 of the Florida Statutes
lacked a mens rea requirement, DAPCA, as written, violated the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 10 According to
the federal court, the Florida Legislature unlawfully attempted to
transform drug possession into a strict liability offense. 11
History-Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act: Child
of Conflict

Prior to May 2002, Florida's drug statutes lacked a knowledge
requirement. In response, the Florida Supreme Court chimed
in: "We believe it was the intent of the legislature to prohibit the
knowing possession of illicit items ... Thus, we hold that the State
was required to prove that [a defendant] knew of the illicit nature
of the items in his possession." 12 In Chicane v. State, the Florida
Supreme Court further held that the trial court erred in denying
the defendant's request for a special jury instruction regarding
knowledge of the illicit nature of the substances. 13
Six years later, the Florida Supreme Court once again
highlighted the need for a knowledge requirement. In Scott v. State,
the court not only reiterated its holding in Chicane, but also declared:
( 1) that "knowledge is an element of the crime of possession of
a controlled substance," (2) that "a defendant is entitled to an
instruction on that element," and (3) that "it is error to fail to give
an instruction even if the defendant did not explicitly say he did
not have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance." 14
Within a few months, the Florida Legislature, in "direct and
express response" to Chicane and Scott, contravened the court's
conclusion, enacting amendments to the DAPCA,15 codified in

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 1296.
See id. at 1297.
Id. at 1296.
Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 744 (Fla. 1996).
Id. at 746.
Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 170-72 (Fla. 2002).
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.
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Section 893.101 of the Florida Statutes. 16 In one sweeping motion,
the Florida Legislature flouted the state judiciary by transforming
-possession into a general intent crime, eliminating the mens rea
requirement, and shifting the responsibilities of the state and the
defendant. The state no longer had to prove that the defendant
was aware of the contraband's illegal nature. The DAPCA
amendment also forced the defendant to assert lack of knowledge
as an affirmative defense, rather than an essential element of the
crime that should be met by the state. Recharacterizing knowledge
as an affirmative defense is a remedy that is worse than the disease.
As a result, the state's case becomes less burdensome to prove.
The defendant, in asserting knowledge as an affirmative defense,
now faces the Hobson's Choice of either conceding knowledge or
raising it as an affirmative defense, thus making it more difficult for
the defendant to rebut both the presumption and the associated
prejudice that comes with it. 17
Nearly a decade later, the conflict between Florida's judicary
and legislative branches was reawakened in Shelton v. Secretary,
Department of Corrections.
Instant Case-The Storm Reawakens in Shelton v. Secretary,
Department of Corrections

'"Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea'-except in Florida,"
wrote Judge Mary Scriven, opening her opinion in Shelton v.
Secretary, Department of Corrections with a bold declaration of the

16

17

FLA. STAT. § 893.101 (2002). Florida Statute§ 893.101 became effective May
13, 2002:
( 1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scottv. State ... and Chiconev. State ...
holding that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the
illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her actual or
constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.
(2) The legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled
substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack
of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an
affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter.
(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative
defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled
substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a permissive
presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the
substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases where
such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the
permissive presumption provided in this subsection. Id.
See Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21,25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
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eyebrow-raising uniqueness of the state's Act. 18 Judge Scriven
characterized the 2002 DAPCA amendment as a "draconian and
unreasonable construction of the law" that refashions the DAPCA
into a strict liability crime "without regard to whether [someone
delivers a controlled substance] purposefully, knowingly, recklessly,
or negligently." 19
The Shelton court found it impermissible that" [u]nder Florida's
statute, that conduct is rendered immediately criminal if it turns out
that the substance is a controlled substance, without regard to the
deliverer's knowledge or intent." 2 First,Judge Scriven stressed that
the mens rea requirement for proving guilt in criminalized conduct
"is firmly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence." 21 Then, Judge
Scriven further underscored the inextricable relation of a mens rea
requirement to American criminal law:

°

A relation between some mental element and punishment
for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to,' and has
afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished
substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of
retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution. To constitute any crime there must first be a
vicious will. 22
Shifting focus and setting her sights on the Florida Legislature,
Judge Scriven continued by recognizing the freedom of state
legislatures to enact strict liability crimes, "but not without severe
constraints and constitutional safeguards." 23 The Shelton opinion
evidenced the "rare" occasion when a legislature is silent to
knowledge requirement, giving rise to a judiciary responsibility to
"engraft a knowledge requirement to cure the state's infirmity and

18
19
20
21
22

23

"The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind also be guilty." Shelton,
802 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1297.
Id. (citing State v. Bell, 649 N.W.2d 243, 252 ( .D. 2002), for the proposition
that the culpability requirement of "willfully" has been an element of the
offense of possession of a controlled substance, and State v. Brown, 389 So.
2d 48, 51 (La. 1980), for the proposition that crafting possession law into a
strict liability crime impermissibly allowed an innocent person to be convicted
"without ever being aware of the nature of the substance he was given.").
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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follow the common-law presumption" barring punishment without
proof of knowledge. 24 In the legacy of Chicane and Scott, Shelton
·represented another attempt-this time, by a federal court-to
cure the faulty decisions of the Florida Legislature.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the DAPCA,Judge Scriven
looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Staples v. United States.
The Staples court held that a mens rea requirement is a rule rather
than an exception when a statute is otherwise silent. 25
The Staples standard for strict liability crimes applies a threeprong test, holding strict liability crimes constitutional only if:
(1) the penalty imposed is slight, (2) a conviction does not result
in substantial stigma, and (3) the statute regulates inherently
dangerous or deleterious conduct. 26 Before applying the Staples
test, Judge Scriven noted that strict liability offenses are usually
"accorded a generally disfavored status." 27
In Shelton, Judge Scriven explained how DAPCA fails each
of the three prongs promulgated in Staples. First, the penalty for
violating the DAPCA is anything but "slight"-those found guilty
face a second-degree felony punishable up to fifteen years, and
habitual offenders face up to thirty years with a ten-year minimum
mandatory. 28 "No strict liability statute carrying penalties of the
magnitude of [the Act] has ever been upheld under federal law,"
notedJudge Scriven. 29 She pointed to UnitedStatesv. Heller, where the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated an interstate kidnapping
statute that, similar to the DAPCA, lacked a mens rea requirement
and imposed a twenty-year maximum penalty. 30 Accordingly,Judge
Scriven held that "the penalties imposed by Florida's strict liability
drug statute are too severe to pass constitutional muster ... doubly
so when considered in conjunction with the other two factors." 31
Resulting in felony convictions for both first-time and habitual
offenders, DAPCA fails the second prong of the Staples test by

24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
See Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994). This requirement was necessary
for two reasons: first, to protect punishment of the innocent, and second, to
protect against the stigma associated with hard penalties. Id. at 616.
See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
Id. At 1300.
See id. at 1298.
Id. at 1300.
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
Id. at 1302.
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creating a substantial stigma. 32 Supporting this finding, Judge
Scriven highlighted everyday personal and professional privileges
enjoyed by most citizens but denied outright to felons-including
the right to vote, sit on a jury, serve in public office, obtain certain
professional licenses, and receive federal student loans. 33 "The
label of 'convicted felon' combined with a proclamation that the
defendant is so vile that he must be separated from society for
fifteen to thirty years, creates irreparable damage to the defendant's
reputation and standing in the community," 34 Judge Scriven noted.
Florida's DAPCA ultimately fails the third and final prong of
the Stap"les test. The statute does not regulate inherently dangerous
conduct; in fact, it does just the opposite: it regulates inherently
innocent conduct. According to Judge Scriven, the elimination of
a mens rea requirement in DAPCA offends due process because it
results in overly broad criminalization and threatens traditional
forms of societal interaction. "Where laws proscribe conduct that
is neither inherently dangerous nor likely to be regulated, the
Supreme Court has consistently either invalidated them or construed
them to require proof of mens rea in order to avoid criminalizing 'a
broad range of apparently innocent conduct."' 35 DAPCA's catch-all
criminalization interferes with the long tradition of the exchange
of goods in all forms of human interaction-public transportation,
commerce, schools, and work. The Shelton court then contrasted the
present case and subject matter-possession and delivery of illicit
goods-with Supreme Court precedent on inherently dangerous
conduct like possessing hand grenades, 36 concluding that DAPCA

32

33
34
35

36

Id., see also United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding
that a mens rea element must be inferred by judicial construction as not to
offend due process: "if Congress attempted to define a Malum prohibitum

offense that placed an onerous stigma on an offender's reputation and that
carried a severe penalty, the Constitution would be offended.").
See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
Id.

Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). In Liparota, the Supreme Court held
that state legislatures were bound by constitutional constraints; specifically, the
charged offense of unlawfully acquiring food stamps required proof that the
accused knew the stamps were acquired unlawfully.
See generally United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 ( 1971) (upholding a tenyear maximum sentence for possession of hand grenades without a mens rea
requirement because "one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession
of hand grenades is not an innocent act").
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still fails to pass constitutional muster. 37 Unlike hand grenades,
which no person could think are innocent, defendants like Josh, this
-comment's innocent protagonist, are regularly-and genuinelyunaware of the illicit nature of the item in their possession.
Judge Scriven then noted that the legislature further acted
unconstitutionally in prompting the state to shift the burden of
proof of the essential mens rea element to the defendant, because
the state's responsibility firmly remains to prove every element
beyond a reasonable doubt. 38 In sum, DAPCA puts an unfair onus
on defendants: plead guilty or find themselves forced into a trial
in which they are presumed guilty. If they do proceed to trial, the
defendant must overcome the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of
proving his innocence for lack of that unconstitutionally presumed
knowledge, (which is no longer an element the state must prove) .39
Through her decision in Shelton, Judge Scriven boldly "declin[ed]
to grant the State broad, sweeping, authority" to unconstitutionally
eliminate the mens rea requirement in Florida's drug laws. Instead,
she prudently declared DAPCA unconstitutional, igniting an
impetus for statewide change. 40

Analysis-Shelton in Law and Practice
The potential changes in Florida's criminal code sparked by
Shelton affect petitioners, practitioners, and the judiciary alike.
Administratively, the Shelton opinion prompted an onslaught of
motions and appeals from defendants around the state who now
contended their convictions under DAPCA were unconstitutional.
This sudden Achilles' Heel to judicial efficiency poses a threat to
the timely disposal of an already crowded docket. 41
37

38

39
40
41

Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1304. Judge Scriven contended that characterizing
mens rea as an affirmative defense "purports to dispense with the fundamental

precept underlying the American system of justice-the presumption of
innocence." Id. at 1307.
Morissette v. U.S. , 342 U.S. 246 (1952); see also United States v. Blankenship,
382 F.3d 1110, 1127 (11th Cir. 2004) ("A defendant is never obligated to prove
anything to ajury.").
See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
Id.
See Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138,141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). The First District
Court of Appeal underscored the systematic upset caused by Shelton and called
for "an expeditious decision from the Supreme Court addressing [DAPCA's]
constitutionality" to "promote the consistent administration of justice by
resolving the issue for the trial courts, thereby allowing drug prosecutions to
proceed." Id. at 141.
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InJuly, 2012, the Florida Supreme Court found DAPCAfacially
constitutional despite its lack of a mens rea requirement in State v.
Adkins. 42 The Adkins decision marked the third time the Florida
Supreme Court contemplated Florida's drug possession and
delivery laws.
In a brief filed with the Supreme CourtofFloridaauthored by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Florida attorneys
annunciate the practitioners' perspective for prompt adjudication
of DAPCA's constitutionality. They begin by recognizing the threat
posed by DAPCA to the integrity of Florida law: "so sweeping is
Florida's elimination of the mens rea requirement for this offense
that it patently contravenes the stated 'General Purposes' of the
entire Florida Criminal Code." 43 The brief's authors allege that
DAPCA fails to give adequate warning to those charged with
the nature of the conduct proscribed, is impermissibly vague in
defining the material elements of the charged offense, and simply
does not adequately safeguard "conduct that is without fault or
legitimate state interest from being condemned as criminal." 44
Further, the brief's authors echo sentiments in Shelton,
espousing the floodgates argument: "if this court finds constitutional
a strict liability statute under which draconian prison sentences
are available, there is nothing to prevent future legislatures from
undertaking a sweeping, wholesale elimination of any mens rea
requirements in their criminal law." 45 DAPCA does not protect
public welfare; it threatens the very interactions that make the
American public free to intermingle without fear of unpredictable
criminal consequence. "Wholly passive, innocent, or no conduct
whatsoever ... is precisely what the State of Florida has permitted
to be targeted by the stripping of any mens rea requirement at all
from its controlled substance law." 46
The deluge of cases and state-level cross-circuit controversy
brought about by the Shelton decision in such a short period of time
denote the importance of the Act's constitutionality as perceived by
both the state 'sjudiciary and its prosecution and defense advocates.
Thousands of defendants and their families await adjudication of
42
43
44
45
46

State v. Adkins, No. SC 111878, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla.July 12, 2012).
Brief for Luke Jarrod Adkins, et al. at 7, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees,
State v. Adkins, (Fla.) (November 28, 2011) (No. SCll-1878) .
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 16.
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their potential exoneration. Both the systematic and practical stress
exerted by the figurative hold placed on cases pending a decision
-on the DAPCA issue is unfair to the very people affected most by
the statute.
In its third encounter with DAPCA, the Florida Supreme
Court should have followed Shelton and mandated the inclusion
of a mens rea requirement. Striking down DAPCA would send
a strong, cautionary, and disciplinary message to the Florida
Legislature that the Florida Supreme Court's stance on DAPCA
remains unchanged. Such a stance would not only underscore
the Court's interpretation of Florida statutes, but also destroy
legislative discretion to chip away at previously established mens
rea elements in other criminal statutes. Restoring this balance of
powers between the two branches of state government would ease
the recent turmoil caused by the Act.
Conclusion
Shelton sliced a much-needed hole into the overly wide and
utterly unconstitutional criminalizing net cast by DAPCA. The
fruits of the current Act cannot be championed as victories in the
war against drugs, but rather as successes in a climate where the
chances of unconstitutional conviction are high.
Systematic concerns aside, the constitutionality of the Act can
be reduced to the fundamental American principle of fairness. In
this spirit, the Florida Supreme Court has a responsibility to adopt
Shelton's analysis and restore the state's citizens' freedom of contact
without fear of criminal misconduct, so defendants like Mr. Shelton
and this comment's anecdotal Josh, are no longer forced to face
the possibility of conviction without consideration of mens rea.
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